Information Theory

Read e-book online Creation and Transfer of Knowledge: Institutions and PDF

By Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Partha Dasgupta, Karl-Göran Mäler, Domenico Siniscalco

ISBN-10: 3642084087

ISBN-13: 9783642084089

ISBN-10: 3662037386

ISBN-13: 9783662037386

Is wisdom an financial stable? that are the features of the associations regulating the construction and diffusion of data? Cumulation of data is a key determinant of monetary progress, yet only in the near past wisdom has moved to the middle of monetary research. contemporary literature additionally supplies profound insights into occasions like medical growth, inventive and craft improvement that have been hardly ever addressed as socio-economic associations, being the area of sociologists and historians instead of economists. This quantity adopts a multidisciplinary method of convey wisdom within the concentration of cognizance, as a key fiscal issue.

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Additional resources for Creation and Transfer of Knowledge: Institutions and Incentives

Sample text

This model considers two risk neutral competitors, which produce the same product and carry out research and development to reduce production costs. Each firm's R&D generates positive spillovers to the other firm. Three different scenarios are compared: first, competition in R&D and in the product market (Cournot competition); second, co-operation in R&D (joint decision on the level of R&D expenditures) and competition in the product market; third, co-operation in both research and product market (the monopoly case).

As before RU and C bargain over the license fee after the innovation occurs and C must still pay a license fee equal to V/2 to RU's owners. However, the researchers themselves now receive areturn of aV/2 for the innovation whereas the outside investor receives (1-a)V/2. Assurning ex ante competition among outside investors leads to 4 Indeed, under C-ownership, E=E*(V) and p= r(E*(V)) with dE*/dV>O and r'>O. Under RU-ownership, e = e*(VI2), E = E*(VI2) and p = r(E*(VI2)) + q(e*(VI2)) with de*/d V> 0 and q'> O.

3 Cash constraints Suppose that E is contractible and consider the situation where C-ownership would be selected provided the customer could finance E*(V) without going on the capital market, but assume now that the customer has less than E*(V) and must borrow in a market that is imperfect for informational reasons. External financing is then more costly than internal financing and a move from C-ownership back to RU-ownership may become attractive since it reduces the customer's required (monetary) investment from E*(V) to E*(V/2), say, and thus reduces the amount of cash C needs to borrow on the capital market.

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Creation and Transfer of Knowledge: Institutions and Incentives by Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Partha Dasgupta, Karl-Göran Mäler, Domenico Siniscalco

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